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della Ferrari
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Paris, 13 September 2007
1
Extraordinary Meeting of
the World Motor Sport
Council
I. Hearing
1. Preliminary Points
Max MOSLEY
At my request, Sebastian has gone to each
of the two teams – McLaren and Ferrari – and explained
that, because the dossier arrived very late
last night, the World Motor Sport Council needed to take
a bit more time to read it before we open
the hearing. I am not sure that everyone has read it.
There is a great deal in it that may not be
directly relevant, and it is not as bulky as it looks.
Nevertheless, I feel you should be given
more time. If you wish to take this time to have a quiet
look at your dossier, this would be a good
opportunity to do so.
President of the World Karting Federation
I wished to point out a possible error in
the first dossier, page 134. Regarding the telephone
discussion, Jonathan Neale is the name that
is listed for each of the witness responses on that page.
If I recall correctly, it was Paddy Lowe
who stated all of this, not Jonathan Neale.
Max MOSLEY
Thank you very much; we will take that on
board.
Are there any other points that people wish
to raise on the dossiers?
[After 20 minutes time, Max Mosley asks
whether there are questions or requests for additional
time. As none are put forward, the teams
are called in.].
For clarity’s sake, we ask that any teams
other than McLaren and Ferrari please sit at the end,
where they will be comfortable. Witnesses,
other than the expert witnesses, will be asked to sit
outside, as we do not have room to seat
them all. In any case, it is preferable that witnesses not be
present during the proceedings. Three seats
have been provided for McLaren and three for Ferrari.
We are trying to accommodate everyone as
best possible.
[It is ascertained that all of the
witnesses other than expert witnesses are outside. Paddy Lowe
being deemed by Max Mosley a witness of
fact in this circumstance, he is also asked to wait
outside.]
I apologise that it was rather difficult to
accommodate all those requiring seating in this room.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
2
We sent out a note in an attempt to limit
the amount of time spent in an actual hearing today,
particularly in view of the large quantity
of documents being circulated. I hope that we will be able
to abide by that schedule.
We thought that the best way of proceeding
was to allow to Ferrari to present its case, as we were
criticised last time for allegedly failing
to allow Ferrari the proper opportunity to do so. Thus, after
preliminary matter, we will allow Ferrari
to present its case for a maximum of 45 minutes.
McLaren will then have 1 hour and 30
minutes to present its position. It would be most efficient if
the actual submissions were very short so
that more time could be dedicated to asking questions
and listening to witnesses. However, it is
up to each party how it wishes to allot time for questions
and, perhaps, other people’s witnesses.
I should also say that it is our intention
– because it has been suggested in the press that these
proceedings are less than fair or that we
are in some way published – a full transcript of both
hearings, (26 July and 13 September) having
first given the parties the opportunity to redact from
those transcripts anything that they feel
is confidential, or for which they can give genuine reason
for not publishing them. It is in the
interest of motor sport and Formula 1 that people can
understand what took place and form their
own opinion as to what happened. We hope to circulate
a transcript within 24 hours, then leave
you 48 hours to make whatever redactions are deemed
appropriate.
I should add that, if there is any question
of imposing any sort of penalty at the close of the hearing,
we will invite the parties back to make
submissions on that, particularly the affected party. This is
fundamental. We will also invite Lewis
Hamilton’s counsel, should there be any decision that
might affect him, so that we can hear
submissions on his behalf. That concludes the preliminary
points, on my part.
Ian MILL
I have two points.
The first is a matter that we did raise in
our skeleton submissions: it concerns the Italian documents,
if I may refer to them as such, which you
have received and which form part of the evidence
against us. You will have read in our
submissions that we have concerns that those documents may
have obtained improperly. We have present,
in the room, if deemed helpful and relevant, our
Italian lawyer, Professor Amodio, who can
explain the issues to you. He has been responsible for
drafting the Italian proceedings which are
in our dossier papers. It may be that this is all a
misunderstanding, but as the President
wrote to us when we received these documents, he had
understood that the reason for their
arrival, at the time of their arrival, was that Ferrari had to obtain
a court order to allow them to be
disclosed. Please understand what these are: these are documents
from the confidential files of the police,
in relation to the potential prosecution of Mr Coughlan and
Mr Stepney. If they are used today, they
will be so for a purpose entirely unconnected from that.
Professor Amodio, who is a witness of fact
for these purposes, states that he spoke to the
prosecutor. The prosecutor told him that
Ferrari had indeed applied to him for permission, and that
he refused it. We have written to Ferrari
for a copy of the court order, for it is entirely possible that
we have misunderstood the position or that
the prosecutor had misremembered events. As I far as
we know, we have yet to receive a response
from Ferrari on that. It is very important that, before
hearing Ferrari’s case, insofar as they are
going to rely on those documents, that a substantive
response be given: if they have obtained a
court order, they should assure us of that and, if they
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
3
have, preferably produce it. In that case,
we can forget about this and move forward. Otherwise,
the World Motor Sport Council needs to
understand that that there may be issues on which my
clients have to reserve their rights,
insofar as they regard and are based upon documents improperly
obtained.
Max MOSLEY
In front of us is a list of 323 text
messages and telephone calls – a combination of the two – over a
3.5 month period. The World Council’s only
concern is whether that list is accurate and truthful.
We are not concerned with whether there are
issues over how that is obtained. Unless there is
evidence that it is forged or inaccurate,
we will take it on its face value. We do not enter a debate
about Italian law; we have neither the time
nor the skills for that. We have a list, we will look at it
and you can make whatever points you wish
to make about it.
Ian MILL
I understand that that is the position that
the World Motor Sport Council has taken. It has to
understand that the fact that it is looking
at the list, and being invited by Ferrari to draw inferences
from that list may create serious problems.
However, if that is how the World Motor Sport Council
wishes to deal with this, then that is
fine. You simply need to know that we reserve our rights with
regard to that.
Max MOSLEY
Absolutely; that is understood. What was
your second point?
Ian MILL
The second was raised just now by Mr
Dennis, who was concerned, upon coming into the room, a
gentleman whom he believes is or has been a
director of Ferrari: Mr Piccinini. He was concerned
as to whether that gentleman intended to
play any substantive part in the proceedings and have an
impingement on the result.
Max MOSLEY
You are quite right to make the point. He
is indeed a director and was, many years ago, the Ferrari
Team Manager. He will not play a part in
the proceedings and will not vote. However, as he is the
Deputy President of Motor Sport for the
FIA, it seemed entirely appropriate that he should be here.
Ian MILL
That seems entirely appropriate. I had
thought that would be the answer.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
4
Max MOSLEY
If you are ready, the floor is Ferrari’s.
2. Counsel Statements
Henry PETER
Mr President, Ferrari will be represented
today by Nigel Tozzi, an English QC and myself.
Ferrari’s case has been presented in detail
in a submission filed on Tuesday, with 64 documents.
Two of these documents are highly
confidential and are thus only with the World Motor Sport
Council: the three exhibit to Mr
Procogenta’s affidavit; as well as two binders containing the 780
pages of material founded at Mr Coughlan’s
domicile. It is only by seeing and weighing it that one
fully realises what is in question.
Max MOSLEY
Might I interrupt you. We are happy to have
these documents shown quickly to the members of the
World Council, but it is up to you to
decide when that will happen.
Henry PETER
Thank you. As requested by the FIA, Ferrari
also filed, before noon, a six-page skeleton in both
French and English. We assume that this has
been read and the case will therefore be presented
quite briefly, at this stage.
I will do this and Nigel Tozzi will then
carry on, developing some of our points.
Relying on the facts known at that time, on
26 July 2007, the World Motor Sport Council found
that McLaren had breached Article 151c of
the International Sporting Code. The WMSC, however,
decided that evidence of any use of the
material found in possession of McLaren was insufficient to
impose a penalty. The Council, however,
reserved the right to invite McLaren back in front of it in
case new evidence emerged.
Since July 26th, new facts have indeed
emerged. First, they show that McLaren has not told the
full story, thus the WC was misled when it
issued its first decision. Secondly, new and impressive
evidence has now been collected, which
shows that a substantial amount of additional confidential
Ferrari information penetrated McLaren at
advanced levels and was used in various manners.
These facts results from documents
collected by the FIA. We refer to the e-mails exchanged by
Alonso, De la Rosa, Coughlan, Lowe and
Stepney and by Ferrari. I am referring here to reports
obtained – legally – by Ferrari, collected
and prepared by the Italian police, with evidence that
hundreds of SMS –
Max MOSLEY
Can I interrupt you? We know all of this.
We need to hear information that is not contained in the
documents, or hear the witnesses. There is
very little new evidence and we are familiar with it.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
5
Henry PETER
Fine. I would like to recall that, if this
illegal possession used by McLaren had not been discovered
by chance, McLaren would probably still be
using it today. Furthermore, if the FIA had not written
to McLaren’s drivers, we would not be here
today. In all of this process, McLaren never
contributed to discovering the truth, at
least not spontaneously.
We believe that McLaren derived substantial
advantage from the knowledge and use of the
material. We know that, with so little
between McLaren and Ferrari, the slightest adjustments can
make a major difference in terms of
results. In view of these facts and this new evidence, we trust
that the World Motor Sport Council will be
able to make the appropriate decision today.
Nigel TOZZI
We started receiving McLaren’s documents at
4 PM yesterday; we did not receive the detailed
submissions until after 6 PM. We are thus
unable to respond in detail. We are very conscious of
the time constraints for today’s hearing.
It is important to understand, then, that any failure to deal
with a point in McLaren’s submissions as an
acceptance of its truth, but simply a reflection of the
time available to us.
The McLaren submissions and witness
statements a number of completely unfounded criticisms of
Ferrari, presumably in an attempt to
deflect attention from their own conduct. We urge you to bear
in mind that we are here to consider
McLaren’s conduct, not that of Ferrari, and indeed not that of
Renault, which also seemed to bear the
brunt of some criticism from McLaren. We are here to
consider McLaren’s conduct. That is the
ambit of this enquiry.
The third point is to remind you of the
language of Article 151c itself, and the fact that you have
already found McLaren, and rightly so, to
be in breach of that Article. Article 151c makes it an
offence where there is any fraudulent
conduct or any act prejudicial to the outcome of a
competition, or to the interest of motor
sport in general. There is no requirement in Article 151 that
it must be shown that a party needs to have
gained advantage or that documents have actually been
used, as in this case. If I may provide
analogies from another sporting arenas. In athletics, if a
runner takes a banned substance, that
runner is disqualified; it is not necessary to show that the
runner has gained an advantage. It is
enough that he has taken a banned substance. If a football
team fields a player who has been banned,
it will be disqualified or lose points. It is not necessary
to show that the said player had any
influence on the outcome of the match.
Max MOSLEY
Mr Tozzi, may I interrupt you for one
second. I do not wish to keep interrupting. The point you
are making is fundamental to motor sport.
Someone can be 1mm over with their wing, or half a
kilo over or under with their weight, and
thereby be disqualified. We have exactly that principle.
Last time, the World Motor Council was
motivated last time by the fact that all of the information
was reported to us to be in the hands of a
rogue employee. We were told that none of the
information had reached anyone in McLaren.
Under those circumstances, it seemed to us unfair to
impose the same sort of penalties as those
that would have been imposed had .in McLaren. It was a
question of fairness, not a rigid
application of the rule. The principle you are explaining is one that
we fully understand and follow. However,
the particular circumstances on the 26th
were that we did
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
6
not have sufficient evidence to rebut the
assurance that none of the information has found its way
into McLaren.
The real issue is as follows: were the 780
pages disseminated into McLaren, to any degree?
Secondly, does the new evidence add
anything in arriving at that answer?
Nigel TOZZI
I understand and will not belabour the
point I was making. I understand the boundaries, but that
does not indicate that I accept that you
are so prescribed.
The key facts for you to consider are, in
light of the new evidence:
- The degree of contact which we now know
to have taken place between Coughlan and
Stepney. I will not respond in any detail
when my learned friend raised his objection to the
manner in which the information was used in
the Italian prosecution. We say that objection
is extraordinary from a party that has come
before this body on several occasions, claiming
a desire to be helpful, cooperative, and
open. It is extraordinary that they are trying to
suppress that information’s being in front
of you, even to the extent of taking materials from
proceedings in Italy and having that
withdrawn.
- We completely reject the suggestion that
we have, in any way, behaved improperly in using
that material. Our Italian lawyer, Mr
Deluca, is here to provide counsel on that. It may be
taken to say that we have a complete answer
to all of the points made by McLaren, which
are misconceived, quite possibly because
they do not understand the full position.
- Thirdly, I would pick up on the
suggestion of cherry-picking. If the FIA wants us to give all
of the material to McLaren which we are
allowed to give, then we are perfectly happy to do
so. It was not a question of
cherry-picking, choosing material that was advantageous to our
case, whilst keeping that material that
might have assisted theirs. Simply, a lot of material
that is quite irrelevant. We are happy for
them to see any additional material that we are
allowed to show them.
More importantly, what does the new
material show? You will have received with your papers, as
Exhibit 61bis, showing exactly what the
nature, timing and extent of these calls were, at different
periods. I invite you, if you have not
already done so, to look at that graph. There are a series of
graphs.
Max MOSLEY
Apparently, the document is confidential
and has not been circulated.
Henry PETER
It is not confidential, it is has been
circulated and is our document, Exhibit 61bis.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
7
Nigel TOZZI
This combines the material from Aligarto 9
with that in Aligarto 18.
Max MOSLEY
We all have it.
Nigel TOZZI
The graph seeks to show, in pictorial and
colour format, detail from the SMS messages, from Mr
Stepney to Mr Coughlan, and the replies
from Mr Coughlan to Mr Stepney, as well as the telephone
calls. We know that, from 11 March to 3
July, 288 text messages were exchanged, and 35
telephone calls took place. The graph shows
that the contact increased in: the period leading up to
the Australian Grand Prix; during private
tests carried out by Ferrari in Malaysia, leading up to and
during the Malaysian Grand Prix; leading up
to and during the Bahrain Grand Prix; and leading up
to and during the Spanish Grand Prix.
This is not the whole picture. These simply
reflect the details that the Italian police have obtained,
by looking at two of Stepney’s phones. One
covers only the period 21 March to 3 July, hence ten
days are missing in this graph; the other
covers only 11 March to 14 April. Anything on the latter
phone is not reflected in this graph. This
is still only a part of the overall picture, then.
Regrettably, we do not have the texts of
the SMS messages, despite our very best efforts to do so.
As far as I am aware, the police does not
either.
What conclusion can we draw from this? Mr
Mill, speaking before you on 26 July, stated that:
“inferences are always open to be drawn in
appropriate circumstances”. This is such a
circumstance. The obvious inference was
that Stepney was feeding confidential information about
Ferrari and the Ferrari car to Coughlan. It
demonstrates that the story that Coughlan told, of only
limited contact with Stepney, was
completely untrue.
What was the content of that contact?
Unfortunately, it is unknown and we must draw inferences.
However, we are assisted by a document not
before you at the previous occasion: an e-mail that
Coughlan has disclosed in a further
affidavit, in the English proceedings. That document is found
in Exhibit 57 of our bundle.
Max MOSLEY
Would it be possible for you to read it?
Nigel TOZZI
This is an e-mail dated 14 March, from
Stepney to Coughlan. The subject is “drag”.
“Mike, apart from the rear wing, I don’t
think this is the whole story. Once the front floor
compresses, when it makes contact with the
ground, which is around the 200km per hour to full
compression,, the drag reduces quite
considerably, due to reduction of air beneath the car. At the
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
8
same time, the turning vanes also move. The
front floor is about 100 cm long, so it is quite an
effective device, also as mentioned in my
previous e-mail, as a mass damper, because it helps in
this mode to control the arrow and keep the
front tyre contact patch. Other areas we look at are
rear stall, but this is difficult to
control. Another solution has been found, which I’ll talk to you
some other time. Regards, Nigel.”
What does that e-mail tell you that you did
not know before? It is quite clearly part of a sequence
of information exchange. He refers to an
earlier e-mail in which he has passed information. He
refers, at the end, to the intention to
tell him further details about another solution, presumably
another solution that Ferrari has found.
Secondly, it plainly has nothing to do with so-called
whistleblowing. The utterly discredited
argument that McLaren ran before you on the last occasion
to justify the admitted use of Ferrari
confidential information, in order to make a complaint to the
FIA. This demonstrates, quite clearly, that
the flow of information from Stepney to Coughlan was
a revelation of Ferrari’s confidential
secrets. In that this is part of a flow, one going on at the dates
we saw, you can and should draw your own
conclusions as to why Stepney should be funnelling
this information to Coughlan, and whether
it is realistic that he should have kept that information to
himself.
As to the information being used, I have
already mentioned whistleblowing, though I suggest that it
was no such thing and, rather, part of a
stream of information. In any case, one does not whistleblow
to the employer’s major competitor. If any
whistle-blowing was to be done, Mr Stepney
should have been sending details to the
FIA. So far as we are aware, he did not provide the sort of
detailed information to the FIA which he
chose to give Coughlan and, thereby, McLaren.
Secondly – and this brings us to the major
piece of evidence that has come to light since the last
hearing – the e-mails disclosed by Pedro de
la Rosa and Fernando Alonso show that, contrary to
what you were told on the last occasion,
the information which Coughlan was receiving from
Stepney was being shared within McLaren.
McLaren has tried very hard to suggest that the
information being disclosed was limited to
only the two drivers, that there was no wider
dissemination within McLaren, and that we
have jumped to a series of inappropriate, unfounded
conclusions. We ask you to use your common
sense, stand back, look at what the e-mails actually
say and compare them with what the McLaren
witnesses try to say to explain them. Ask
yourselves, “Does that ring true?” We
suggest that, when you ask yourselves those questions, you
will come to the only conclusion that you
can: that you are being fed a line that is not the complete
story. Moreover, this puts into context
what you were told on the last occasion about, for instance:
the installation of the firewall,
Coughlan’s extraordinary trip to Barcelona to tell someone to stop
contacting him, and the incredible account
of the meeting between Coughlan and Neale, when
Coughlan tried to give him a document and
Neale, quite deliberately, turned a blind eye.
The further documents that have come to
light are found in the FIA dossiers at Tab 5. First, could
you turn to Page 61? This shows a very
short e-mail dated 21 March, from Pedro de la Rosa to
Mike Coughlan:
“Hi Mike, do you know the red car’s weight
distribution? It would be important
for us to know so that we could try it in
the simulator.”
Why does de la Rosa ask Coughlan? We would
suggest that it is because he knows that Coughlan
has a link into Ferrari via Stepney. Why
does he want that information? You see what he has said
in his statement. But look at what he
explains in his e-mail: “So that we
can try it in the
simulator”.
This is not curious interest, as he attempts to portray it in his witness
statements. He
wants it in order to copy it in the
simulator, in his own words.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
9
I ask now that you turn to the next e-mail
in the sequence. On page 52 of the English proceedings.
It is an e-mail dated 25 March 2007, sent
at 01:43. De la Rosa reports to Alonso on results which
he has following the experiment in the
simulator. In the versions we have, there has been a certain
amount of redaction, or blocking-out of
text. Consequently, one must work out what is actually
said. Item 1 is about a variable brake
balance system. This is important because, as you know –
and we have drawn this to your attention on
several occasions – one of the aspects that interested
Coughlan in particular was the Ferrari
brake balance system, an innovative and unique design. In
his own, discredited affidavit, Coughlan
admitted asking Stepney about it on no less than four
occasions. We know also that he came back
with a sketch, which he showed Taylor. Here, we see
an exchange of e-mails demonstrating that
McLaren is very interested in the design of a similar
system. For those of you who are entitled
to view the e-mail with all of the words left in, I invited
you do so. Regardless, in the e-mail, Mr de
la Rosa is saying that, “with the
information that we
have, we believe Ferrari has a similar
system: they have three positions which they change from
the cockpit.”
He also describes, saying: they have “A”.
(In our version, the text has been blanked
out, but in de la Rosa’s version, he tells
you what they are.) He says, “that
was phrase which I did
not understand, something that Coughlan had
told me three days earlier, which I had memorised.”
Please think about whether this sounds very
credible. He says, “They have this
system which
delays the rear-braking initially then
proceeds to increase it gradually.”
This is not an e-mail from
a man who has not understood what he has
been told. “We get the same results
using a valve.” In
other words, he clearly does understand
what he has been told.
On Item 2, the flexible rear wing he says,
“this is also a copy of the system
we think Ferrari uses.
It is another two- to three-tenths of a
second quicker”. Then Item 5:
“information from Ferrari,
their weight distribution in Australia was
‘…’”, giving very precise details.
Max MOSLEY
Not to interrupt, but in the next paragraph
of the e-mail, he states that, “it
will take them a few
weeks or a month or two to have it”.
That would suggest that, perhaps, the
intention is to make the
same device.
Nigel TOZZI
Exactly. I agree with you.
Then there is reference to very detailed
information, which De la Rosa admits having received from
Coughlan: the car’s aerobalance, and the
use of an alternative to air to inflate the tyres. Here, he
comments,
“We use nitrogen; we’ll have to try it,
it’s easy!” They are clearly using
that
information with a view toward copying it.
Alonso’s reply in relation to the brake
balance is: “I hope you can try this
out. I don’t know
whether it is ready".
He is keen for it to be tried it. The next
passage that has been blanked out,
allegedly on grounds of confidentiality.
However, because we saw this before it was blanked out,
we know what it said, cannot erase it from
our memories, and we have referred to it in our
submissions. I do not accept that this is
in any way confidential. If you do see it, you will see what
I say that.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
10
On Item 2, the rear wing, he says, “Let’s
hope this only takes one month”,
indicating that he wants
this process to speed up. On Item 5, he
comments in terms about the weight distribution and what
this draws attention to.
“It is very important to test the [blank], since in the race, they have
something different from the rest.”
You can read this for yourselves.”
De la Rosa comes back, saying:
“all of the information from Ferrari is
very reliable. It comes from
Nigel Stepney, their former chief mechanic.
I don’t know what post he holds now. He is the same
person who told us in Australia that Kimi
was stopping in Lap 18. He is very friendly with Mike
Coughlan, our chief designer, and he told
him that.” He refers to something
being ready for testing
on Tuesday, then says,
“I agree 100%, we must test the [blank]
very soon.”
You are being told that this was being
passed only between the drivers and that none of this
information was shared with any of the
engineers. Alonso is saying that “we
must test this!”. Yet
you are asking to believe that because de
la Rosa subsequently had a conversation with someone
from Bridgestone who said that this does
not always work, that the entire idea was dropped. Does
this sound credible? We say it does not.
Going back to the e-mail and the
information about Kimi stopping in Lap 18, there is a lame
attempt to suggest that this is not
reliable, because he actually stopped in Lap 19. As you will all
know, the difference between Laps 18 and 19
may arise simply because you have enough petrol to
eke into the next lap. The key point is
that Coughlan was being fed information about Ferrari’s
race plans, which he passed on to the
drivers. Did the drivers keep that information to themselves?
Do you really think they would? Use your
common sense. Use your knowledge of the sport. We
say you should draw some obvious
conclusions.
Let me take you forward in the bundle, to
page 62. This very interesting sequence of e-mails starts
with de la Rosa pressing Coughlan for
details of the Ferrari braking system:
“Can you explain me
as much you can Ferrari’s braking system?
What are they doing?” Coughlan
initially says, “it
may be difficult for you to understand”.
Yet De la Rosa presses him for the
information, saying,
“Fernando wants to know”.
Eventually, Coughlan gives him a very
detailed description of our
braking system. He must have and can only
have gotten that from Stepney. You are being told by
de la Rosa that, because he did not
understand it, he did not share that information with anyone.
Again, use your common sense: does his
sound very credible? Here is Coughlan, disseminating
information. Bear in mind that Coughlan had
said, in his affidavits, that apart from the whistleblowing,
he had no other contact with Stepney and
that he had not shared this information with
anyone from McLaren. You now see a very
different picture emerging.
Why does this picture emerge? Because the
drivers blew the whistle, making for a very interesting
story in itself. When Alonso raised the
existence of documentation on 5th
August with Mr Dennis,
obviously in the context of some dispute,
he mentioned the matter to your President, but did he try
to get to the bottom of it? Did he say, “If
you have documents, I must have them, because I am
under duty to the FIA to take them back to
the World Motor Sport Council.” No, he did not. We
received this information only because the
FIA wrote to the drivers, telling them that they were
under duty to disclose. It was not been
volunteered by McLaren. That tells you a great deal about
the internal investigations carried out by
McLaren and their enthusiasm to volunteer information.
We therefore say: look at the facts; don’t
listen to the assertions. The facts are that this is
information that FIA secured from the
drivers. It did not result from an internal investigation by
McLaren.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
11
How does this fit in with the rest of the
facts? According to Coughlan, we know that he spoke to
Stepney on four occasions about the brake
balance and was given a drawing, which he showed to
Taylor. Mr Taylor seeks to suggest that
this was nothing to him. An engineer of Mr Taylor’s
experience would instantly have known that
he was being shown provided a significant
improvement in functionality. We have
included evidence from Professor Genter explaining this to
you in some detail. In McLaren’s submission
(the lengthy document), more is told about what was
happening in the McLaren camp. I ask that
you turn to page 6 of their submissions, at Paragraph
15. It starts on page 5; I will pick up the
story on page 6. “McLaren’s novel system” – purportedly
their own – is described in the following
terms: “From mid-February 2007,
based on an idea of Mr
Lowe, McLaren developed a novel and
completely different system for achieving variation of the
relative braking mode on the front and rear
axels. They say that McLaren’s system was tested on
22 and 29 March, and introduced at the
Spanish Grand Prix on 13 May. It was inspected and
approved by Mr Whiting”,
who is then quoted.
“In the first Grand Prix, McLaren observed
that
Ferrari was using lever, which it believed
was likely to be part of a quick-shift system.”
Immediately after the Grand Prix, Mr Lowe
instructed a team of vehicle dynamics specialists to
study footage – in effect, ordering a
spying exercise to see hat Ferrari has. He says that,
“Coughlan
was not involved this study. The team
confirmed that this appeared to be part of a quick-shift
system.”
Then, it is said that,
“since some engineering resource had become
free, Lowe asked
Coughlan to release an engineer to him to
produce 2007 version. Coughlan released Chris Lewis
to this task. Lewis quickly designed such a
system.” They add that the evidence
of Lowe and
Lewis shows that this was designed entirely
independently, based on McLaren’s 2001-2002 design.
If you turn to the statement of Mr Lewis,
which we received yesterday, it says that:
“In early April
2007”
– the dates are important, bearing in mind the e-mails we have just seen –
“Mike [Coughlan]
asked me to begin work to design a
quick-shift brake balance adjustment system, not a particularly
difficult task, as McLaren had used a
quick-shift system before, in 2001 and 2002. My work
mainly involved taking the knowledge that
we already had about quick-shift systems and optimising
it for use on the 2007 McLaren car”.
He exhibits a document that we have not seen. He then
confirms what Mr Lowe has said to you in a
document we have not seen is correct. In particular,
he states that,
“For the purposes of the quick-shift
project, I reported to Mike directly, without the
involvement of my team leader, while Mike
supervised the project. His involvement was no more
than the general supervision and direction
he gives to all drawing projects. For example, Mike
outlined the idea that I import that
2001-2002 design into the 2007 car. I looked at that previous
design and brought it into a CAD scheme,
with changes necessary for it to fit the 2007 car. Mike
and I and Pat Frye reviewer this scheme and
agreed the final details. I completed the detailed
design and component drawings, which Mike
approved for manufacturing.”
Here is someone reporting directly to Mike
Coughlan, working on a brake-balance system. At the
same time, you have hard evidence that
Coughlan is pestering Stepney for details of the Ferrari
system and exchanging that information with
at least De la Rosa at exactly that time. Yet you are
being asked to accept that he did not
contribute any ideas that he might have obtained from Ferrari
to the development of the McLaren system.
The McLaren system may be different; of course it is,
for it was designed by different people.
We submit that the idea that Coughlan did
not use any of the information he had obtained
illegitimately from Ferrari to contribute
to the development of that design is so fanciful that you
should not accept it. More to the point,
the people who will come along and testify the “he did not
give us any confidential information”
probably don’t know. If Coughlan simply says, “have you
tried this?” or “have you thought about
that?”, they are not to know that he has that idea because it
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
12
has been purloined by Stepney from Ferrari.
They see it as Coughlan contributing to the discussion.
And we suggest that the fact that he is
sitting on the information and pressing Stepney for details is
the clearest indication of use, or perhaps
only attempted use of Ferrari’s documentation and
information. It is certainly enough for you
to conclude, gentlemen, that something has to be done.
Of further interest is Mr Taylor, with whom
Mr Coughlan also seeks to discuss this on the first
working day following his trip to
Barcelona. He goes to him with the drawing, asking what he
thinks about it. This is part of that
bigger picture that we suggest you consider. We say that there
is something odd about the fact that, in
Australia, the Ferrari cars were so much better than the
McLaren cars. Yet, as you all know, McLaren
has caught up. Gentlemen, if you wish to ask about
technical details, we have witnesses
present. Mr Braun, in particular, will be able to deal with any
technical inquiries you may have.
Might I also remind you of something that
Mr Neale said in a relatively recent press interview? It
touches upon the issue of use, what can be
relied upon, etc. In the 11-12 August issue of the
Financial Times Magazine,
Mr Neale stated, referring to the McLaren
car: “There isn’t much on
the car that stays the same; maybe the
seatbelts don’t change. From the moment the car is formed
in January to the last race in October, we
make an engineering change on average every twenty
minutes. We started behind Ferrari, but
what determines how the season progresses is how quickly
you can change the car.”
You will be bombarded with technical
information from Paddy Lowe, saying that he knows the
DNA of every change and can tell you
exactly its origin. With the greatest respect, whatever the
document you are shown and we are not, I
doubt that he will be able to detail with every change
made every 20 minutes. The gap in Formula 1
is so tight that, as Dr Braun says, you can win or
lose a race by a matter of one-tenth of a
second. Top teams invest hundreds of millions of dollars
to gain a technical advantage. Possession
of a portfolio of information by someone as experienced
as Mr Coughlan would be worth several
tenths of a second. Coughlan is a designer with 15 to 20
years of experience. He is employed on a
significant salary by McLaren. He is more than the
Office Manager suggested by McLaren.
Max MOSLEY
Mr Tozzi, I do not mean to be annoying, but
we are nearing the 45-minute mark.
Nigel TOZZI
I have my watch here and am quite aware of
that.
The content of the e-mails is
wholly-inconsistent with what you were told by McLaren at the last
occasion, where they claimed to have
carried out a thorough investigation. Either it was thorough
and information was suppressed until Alonso
blew the whistle, or it was not thorough, in which
case you cannot place any trust in
assertions such as those made on the last occasion and which are
almost certain to be repeated on this
occasion. In the context of what you now know, you must
look at the other evidence. I have already
mentioned the firewall, the trip to Barcelona and the
meeting with Mr Neale. In view of the time,
I will not develop those submissions. In our written
submissions, we do say that the
explanations offered are fantastic, simply unbelievable and should
not be accepted, particularly in the light
of the further information.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
13
We have reached a position where we know
that members of the McLaren design team were
involved: Mr Coughlan certainly, as well as
Mr Taylor and, possibly Mr Lowe. We know that the
Management is involved. Whatever they may
say, Mr Neale quite obviously turned a blind eye to
the documents shown to him by Mr Coughlan,
knowing that he had extensive contact with Stepney
and had been receiving confidential
information from him. We know that the drivers are involved,
Pedro De la Rosa and Alonso both knew that
Coughlan was receiving information from Stepney.
Designers, management, drivers: how many
people in McLaren need to be involved before it can be
concluded that there was not only one “bad
apple”, and that there is systematic failure throughout
McLaren to behave in a proper way. The
conclusions we invite you to draw are listed in Paragraph
30 of our skeleton argument. I will not
read them out. We do submit, bearing in mind Article 151,
that it is important that the World Motor
Sport Council does something now to restore the
reputation of Formula 1 and not allow the
sport to become and anarchic free-for-all.
I think I have managed to stick to my 45
minutes.
Max MOSLEY
Mr Mill, it is your turn.
Ian MILL
Gentlemen, could I start with the following
central propositions:
1) The McLaren 2007 car is and the 2008 car
will be 100% the product of McLaren
technology, know-how, skill and endeavour.
2) No part of either car contains or will
contain any element of Ferrari confidential information
.
3) No use of Ferrari confidential
information has been made, is being made or will be made, in
the design or development of either McLaren
car.
With regard to these central points, we
offer the following general observations by way of opening:
1) Firstly, Ferrari is unable to point to
any component part which it is able to establish as
having been used by McLaren on its car. It
is absolutely obvious that, over and above that
what you have seen from Ferrari and hear
from it today, every step imaginable has been
taken to try to establish this. We know
what sorts of steps are taken. We know what is
done in the Formula 1 world, legitimately
as Mr Tozzi rightly accepts: observation,
photography, listening to transmissions,
watching onboard footage, etc. I and you,
certainly, have no doubt that Ferrari has
pored over every piece of information that it can
find on the McLaren car between April and
today’s date. Yet there is not a single allegation
on the basis of that. The reason for this
is that none can be made.
2) Ferrari is unable to make any more than
a wholly-generalised assertion, backed up by
nothing more than unjustified surmise and
inference that use has been made.
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
14
3) The FIA does not point to any part of
the McLaren car, which involves the use of Ferrari
confidential information. The FIA has had,
from the outset, an open invitation as stated last
time and since repeated, to visit the
McLaren premises, inspect the McLaren car, look at
McLaren records (including test records),
to satisfy itself whether any use has been made.
That offer is repeated and has not been
taken up. If the FIA had any genuine basis for
concern in this respect it would have taken
up the offer.
4) McLaren has provided and, if you have
not had the opportunity to read the documents,
compelling, clear and unequivocal evidence
that no Ferrari confidential information has
been used. You have before you the very
detailed, confidential statement by Mr Lowe,
attached to which is a signed statement
from all of McLaren’s engineers, except the five
away on holiday and uncontactable. Every
other McLaren engineer has come forward and
put their names on the document.
This case, therefore, is not one about
McLaren using Ferrari confidential information in its car this
year or next. There simply is not a case to
be made on that. Therefore, no question of any
substantial sanction against McLaren can
arise.
What is this case about? Let us briefly
recall what happened last time: we were summoned on short
notice to answer a wholly-ungeneralised
charge of possession of Ferrari documents. We were
informed of the charge on 12 July, and did
our best on the time available to answer it. A hearing
was held precisely two weeks later. I do
not need to reiterate what occurred on that occasion. You
were there, recall it and have had the
opportunity, if you needed it, to view the transcript to remind
you further. The allegations related to a
dossier provided by Mr Stepney to Mr Coughlan in
Barcelona and also, possibly, the
disclosure to the FIA of allegedly illegal elements of the Ferrari
car. We told you then what investigations
we had carried out, we told you that we had spoken to
the engineers, putting forward the evidence
of Mr Lowe and Mr Taylor. We spoke to the
Management, and put forth the evidence of
Mr Neale and Mr Dennis. We instructed leading
computer experts to trawl through the
computers of Mr Coughlan and McLaren. We gave Ferrari
access to do the same thing. Neither found
any material document.
Nothing before you on 26 July suggested
further avenues of inquiry or identified other parties about
whom McLaren should have come forward. In
particular, nothing on that occasion was available to
us that we needed to make inquiries of our
drivers: the FIA had not identified any material making
that appropriate, nor had Ferrari, and Mr
Coughlan had certainly not told us anything about that.
We had his affidavit in the same way that
you do. We put forth evidence on that occasion, which
was and remains true. The dossier was kept
by Mr Coughlan in his home. No one had knowledge
of its existence. The disclosure that we
knew about in March was legitimate whistleblowing. Since
that last hearing, we submit that nothing
has merged calling into question McLaren’s evidence on
these matters.
There have, however, been two developments.
First, the drivers came forward with information, as
a result of a letter form the President,
showing that Mr Coughlan had given certain information to
Mr de la Rosa, which Mr Coughlan said he
had obtained from Mr Stepney. This happened last
week. It is right to point out the
background against which this occurred. Somehow, Ferrari wishes
to make criticism or point on it. Quite to
the contrary: it shows McLaren in a completely proper and
straightforward light. Mr Dennis
volunteered to Mr Mosley, at the time of the Hungarian Grand
Prix, that one of his drivers had told him
that he had received Ferrari information from a McLaren
engineer. He then also told Max Mosley –
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
15
Max MOSLEY
I am sorry. First of all, I do not recall
that being in Mr Dennis’ statement. Secondly, it is
completely untrue: he did not say that he
received the information from an engineer. He told me
that he had information that was damaging,
which he was prepared to give to the federation. He
did not say it came from an engineer.
Ian MILL
If I have mischaracterised Mr Dennis’
evidence, I apologise. I was not intending to engage in
evidential debate; I was simply seeking to
summarise what I believed to be Mr Dennis’ evidence.
We will hear from him. If I am mistaken, I
apologise.
Subsequently, he told Mr Mosley that Mr
Alonso had retracted that allegation through his manager
(and Mr Mosley’s nod indicates that at
least I got that part right). Mr Dennis did not believe the
original suggestion from Mr Alonso.
However, the fact that he brought it to the attention of the
President of the FIA is the clearest
indication that he believed that there was nothing further to be
disclosed. If Mr Dennis had known that Mr
Alonso might be in possession of damaging
information, why would he tell the
president of the FIA? That is hardly conduct consistent with
bad faith or dishonesty on the part of my
client and Mr Dennis, in particular. It is consistent only
with our position throughout. It is said by
Mr Tozzi that McLaren did not in fact investigate. You
can ask Mr Dennis why this was: he
genuinely believed that the assertion was not true and it was
almost immediately retracted. Yes, he could
have said that, despite his belief on this, he ought to
go back and check. Hindsight is a wonderful
thing. Do not infer from that any bad faith on the part
of Mr Dennis. The FIA could have told Mr
Dennis to go and check. It did not. Clearly, the FIA
did not think that it was appropriate or
necessary for McLaren to take any further steps at that stage.
The second development is that Ferrari has
obtained – they say legally so – certain selected
documents from police files in Italy and
supplied these to the FIA. These suggest, assuming that
they are accurate, contact between Coughlan
and Stepney beyond that to which Mr Coughlan had
previously admitted. However, this does not
mean that McLaren was aware of it. It was not. The
documents do not suggest, other than on the
basis of an inference which we will rebut, further
contact between Coughlan and people in
McLaren, which is material for the purposes of your
consideration. Ferrari’s response to this
new information has been to make a series of wild and
unsubstantiated allegations. They are
contained within the conclusion which Mr Tozzi has invited
you to read. I will invite you to do the
same. I will take you through it and tell you our answers to
each point.
In response to the question as to what is
in issue before you today, I will say the following: you are
being asked by Ferrari to make a series of
inferences and assumptions in the absence of direct
evidence, from which you are inevitably
being asked to infer that all those who come forth on
behalf of McLaren are lying and that use
has been made despite the denials from McLaren
witnesses. McLaren invites you not to work
on inference and assumption, when you have direct
evidence. We invite you to listen to the
witnesses, read their witness statements and to do so
quietly, dispassionately and, above all,
carefully, and reach your own conclusions.
What conclusion must you reach? Can you, to
the standard required of you, as I will later define,
be satisfied that our evidence, which fully
rebuts any inference that Ferrari might wish you to draw,
is to be disbelieved? The President, on
more than one occasion, following the promulgation of the
Extraordinary Meeting
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Paris, 13 September 2007
16
last decision of the World Motor Sport
Council, has made it clear (and correctly so) that, given the
very serious nature of these matters, you
would have to be satisfied to a very high standard before
you can convict of usage. I think that, in
one letter, the President, in response to the letter from the
Italian MSA, referred to the need to show
unequivocal evidence. In our submission, given the very
grave allegations and the fact that several
of my witnesses are facing potential criminal proceedings
in Italy, you must be satisfied to a
criminal standard – meaning, beyond reasonable doubt. I ask – I
require – you to look Mr Lowe, Mr Dennis,
Mr de la Rosa and Mr Hamilton in the eye and, unless
you are satisfied beyond doubt that each
and every one of them is lying to you, you will let us off. I
am not asking that you dismiss the charge.
That is a matter for elsewhere. However, you will not
find that use has been made. If you do
nonetheless do so, without being able to make those
decisions, then you are making a very
serious legal error. It is not only those who are here. 140
McLaren engineers signed the letter: will
you disbelieve each of them as well? If so, we will
contact them by phone and you will be able
to question them. We did not bring them here, for that
would have been absurd. Nonetheless, there
is a huge body of evidence showing that you cannot
and must not draw inferences adverse to
McLaren on the information available to you, because
those inferences are false.
It is right, given what I have just said,
that you bear in mind that this is not the referral of your
previous decision, which must go elsewhere.
It has been withdrawn. However, the referral
allowed the body to which the reference is
being made – our International Court of Appeal – to
look afresh at the events on the 26 July,
the evidence given and the factual conclusions reached.
That is not your function. You are
functus
in relation to that; you cannot review your
own decision.
Rather, you can consider the effect of new
evidence. When you hear Mr Tozzi say that Mr Neale’s
evidence must, of course, be disbelieved,
on what basis are you to do that? You made your
findings on Mr Neale’s evidence. You had
your doubts about it. Mr Mosley made that clear. Yet
you did reach your conclusions. Unless
something material in the new evidence entitles you to
form a different opinion about Mr Neale,
that matter rests with you. If there is a subsequent referral
or appeal, that is another matter, but is
it not a matter for you. This is, in short, not an opportunity
for Ferrari to make the same points as it
did last time. Quite a large part of the submissions before
you today were the same put in for the
International Court of Appeal. I am not criticising them for
this. Clearly, having produced a body of
work, they are entitled to use it and adapt it. However,
while their assertions may have been
apposite at the time, they are not so for this body today.
Could I ask for some respectful silence,
from your right?
Max MOSLEY
I think you have that.
Ian MILL
It i |